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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
addition, there is authority that as a general rule the exemption should be con-
strued strictly against the party claiming it 2 9 Thus, a.denial of the exemption
in the present case would not have been without basis.
The exemption statute must, however, not be so strictly construed as to
vitiate its purpose.30 The purpose of this easing of the tax burden is to encour-
age, foster, and protect charitable institutions in view of the benefit to the
community afforded by the religious, moral, and intellectual influence of these
institutions.31 The courts, then, should not be overly strict in construing char-
itable exemptions and should take into account modern changes in society as
the result of which religious organizations may engage in not strictly religious
practices in order to further their religious goals. Recent case law indicates
a recognition of the fact that an indirect application of the property to a char-
itable or religious purpose need not defeat the statutory exemption.8 2 In not
requiring that the 5% surplus produce be plowed back into the ground, the
Court expanded on the literal meaning of the statute. This decision, however,
confirms a trend toward a more realistic application of the statute, upholding
the spirit of the charitable exemption.
J.D.R.
TAx INCUASE ON Himss Tmacxs UPHELD
In 1956, pursuant to Article I, Section 9 of the New York Constitution, 8
the Legislature added Section 45-a to the Pari-Mutuel Revenue Law.34 In
1959 the plaintiff brought an action to compel the Harness Racing Commission
to credit its construction account for Federal income taxes in lieu of Section
45-a. Before the action was tried, the Legislature enacted the 1959 amendment
to Section 45-a explicitly prohibiting reimbursement for Federal income taxes.3 5
After the plaintiff had obtained the relief requested in the complaint in
29. Congregation Gedulath Mordecai v. City of New York, 135 Misc. 823, 238 N.Y.
Supp. 525 (Munic. Ct. 1929).
30. Congregation Emanu-E1 v. City of New York, 150 Misc. 657, 270 N.Y. Supp. 6
(Sup. Ct. 1934).
31. Van Astyne, supra note 17 at 462; Seminary of Our Lady of Angels v. Barber,
supra note 25.
32. Cf. Seminary of Our Lady of Angels v. Barber, supra note 25; Clarkson College v.
Haggett, supra note 24; Pace College v. Bayland, supra note 23; N.Y. Conference of 7th
Day Adventists v. Nutt, supra note 25.
33. N.Y. Const. art I, § 9:
no lottery ... except pari-mutuel betting on horse races as may be prescribed by the
legislature and from which the state shall derive a reasonable revenue for the
support of the government, shall hereafter be authorized . . . ; and the legislature
shall pass appropriate laws. ...
34. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 7603-a(lO) (McKinney 1956). The statute provides in
general for a credit to a construction account for capital improvement, "until such date as
the amounts paid to such harness race track from the construction account les income taxes
paid thereon to the United States by such harness race track, equals the cost of capital
improvement."
35. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 8020(10) (McKinney 1961). The statute provides that no
harness race track shall be reimbursed for any Federal income taxes.
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the Supreme Court,36 and in the Appellate Division,37 the defendant appealed
to the Court of Appeals.
The main issues before the Court of Appeals in the present case, Roosevelt
Raceway, Inc. v. Monaghan,38 were whether Section 45-a was constitutional,
and whether the 1959 amendment operated as an unconstitutional impairment
of a contractual obligation. The Court, with five separate opinions, reversed
the Appellate Division and Supreme Court.
Chief Judge Desmond and Judge Burke concerned themselves with the
question of whether Section 45-a was a tax statute,39 for if it was not, then the
1959 amendment was invalid as an impairment of the contractual obligation
created by Section 45-a. Chief Judge Desmond, basing his opinion on the
statutory exclusions from taxation found in the New York Tax Law,40 con-
cluded that an exemption from taxation means an immunity or freedom from
tax.41 There was no exemption under Section 45-a, as the statute guaranteed
that the State would receive taxes no lower than those paid by plaintiff in 1955.
The statute reduced taxes only if plaintiff paid taxes in any year beyond the
1955 level, and then only if the amount of the reduction was applied by the
plaintiff to a construction project which would produce increased taxes for the
state. Chief Judge Desmond also concluded that this statute was not a sur-
render of the taxing power under the first phrase in Article XVI, Section 1
under any reasonable interpretation. The 1959 amendment was held to be an
unconstitutional impairment of a contract created by Section 45-a.
Judge Burke held that this statute was not a general tax statute for sev-
eral reasons. The track by making improvements will have to pay more, and
not less taxes. The State only promised the plaintiff that it would be reim-
bursed for capital improvements by an adjustment of tax rates, which can be
the subject of a contract, as it is not a tax exemption or a yielding of the tax
power. Judge Burke further indicated that the Legislature was empowered
under Article I, Section 9 to make such a contract.
Judge Froessel, in upholding the constitutionality of Section 45-a, placed
his reliance on Article I, Section 9 of the New York Constitution.42 This pro-
vision gave power to the Legislature to regulate betting. In view of the State's
desire for increased revenue, it had the power to reduce tax rates by applying
excess monies to the construction fund.
36. 22 Misc. 2d 776, 199 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
37. 11 A.D.2d 206, 202 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1st Dep't 1960).
38. 9 N.Y.2d 293, 213 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1961).
39. N.Y. .Const. art. XVI, § 1:
The power of taxation shall never be surrendered, suspended or contracted
away. ...
Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by general laws. Exemptions
may be altered or repealed except for those exempting real or personal property
used exclusively for religious, educational or charitable purposes.
• 40. N.Y. Tax Law § 4.
41. E.g., City of Rochester v. Rochester Ry. Co., 182 N.Y. 99, 74 N.E. 953 (1905).
42. Supra note 33.
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On the other hand, Judge Dye, although concurring with Judge Fuld, held
Section 45-a unconstitutional for several reasons, one of which was based on
the inability of the Legislature to surrender the taxing power. However, his
main contention was that the money in the construction fund was public money
which cannot be paid out in aid of a private corporation.
43 Furthermore, funds
belonging to the State or under its control can only be paid out by legislative
appropriation,44 and only upon the audit of the comptroller.4" These construc-
tion monies were held to be public funds because they are derived from the 15
per cent set aside from the betting pool from which taxes due the State are to
be paid and are not available to the tracks until the 1955 tax totals are ex-
ceeded. The State by implication has the beneficial ownership, as the funds
are subject to periodic audit and may not be used except for the purposes of
Section 45-a. The fact that the money is not in the public treasury does not
change its character.
46
Judge Fuld, with Judges Van Voorhis and Foster concurring, held that
the 1959 amendment was valid as an exercise of the taxing power regardless of
the validity or invalidity of Section 45-a, which they refused to pass upon in
the exercise of their discretion. However, Judge Fuld stated his belief that
Section 45-a was probably unconstitutional under Article XVI, Section 1 of
the New York Constitution. 47 The exact content of the contract which plaintiff
claimed to exist was not at all translucent. In the lower courts plaintiff had
successfully contended that the State had not employed public funds for the
construction of harness tracks, and if this position is now accepted, then the
only other alternative is to hold that the contract in question is one for tax
relief. It is thus a promise to keep in force tax rates which deprive the State
of tax revenues and, therefore, violates the first provision of Article XVI, Section
1 of the State Constitution, which provides that the State shall not surrender
the tax power. Furthermore, the fact that Section 45-a will ultimately increase
tax revenues does not negate the conclusion that a certain amount of plaintiff's
revenues were exempt from taxation. It is thus subject to repeal under the
second provision of Article XVI, Section 1.
Of course, once Section 45-a is found to be constitutional and not a tax
statute, the dissenting judges must find the requisite elements of a contract
43. N.Y. Const. art. VII, § 8:
The money of the state shall not be given or loaned to or in aid of any private
corporation or association ....
44. N.Y. Const. art. VII, § 7:
No money shall ever be paid out of the state treasury or any of its funds, or any of
the funds under its management, except in pursuance of an appropriation by
law. ...
45. N.Y. Const. art. V, § 1:
The payment of any money of the state, or of any money under its control, or
the refund of any money paid to the state execpt upon audit by the comptroller,
shall be void....
46. See Fox v. Mohawk and Hudson River Humane Soc., 165 N.Y. 517, 59 N.E.
353 (1901); People ex rel. Ensfield v. Murray, 149 N.Y. 367, 44 N.E. 146 (1896).
47. Supra note 39.
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present. On this point Chief Judge Desmond and Judge Burke were correct.
There was an offer, and an acceptance coupled with reliance on the part of
the plaintiff.
48
It is submitted that Judge Fuld's position on the constitutionality of Sec-
tion 45-a, although he specifically refused to pass on this issue, is more tenable,
no matter whether Section 45-a is considered as a surrender of the tax power
or a tax exemption subject to amendment. As Judge Fuld pointed out, if this
statute is not a tax statute, then it would probably be unconstitutional under
the public monies theory of Judge Dye, although Chief Judge Desmond and
Judge Burke failed to discuss this possibility. But aside from that, it is appar-
ent that plaintiff's construction is being financed as a result of lower taxes.
Under Article XVI, Section 1 of the New York Constitution it would seem
that the State cannot be bound by such a contract.
It is noteworthy that Judge Fuld did not rely on the constitutional issues
involved in Section 45-a but attacked the 1959 amendment directly in an
attempt to avoid the main constitutional issues. It was especially appropriate
to avoid discussion of the constitutional issues involved in Section 45-a, when
for all practical purposes the validity of Section 45-a may never arise again.49
It is to be noted also that the avoiding of the constitutional issues removes
the need to answer the contention of Judges Burke and Froessel that this stat-
ute is authorized by another constitutional provision, Article I, Section 9. If
such an issue must be faced, it must necessarily result in making a choice
between Article I, Section 9 and Article XVI, Section 1, unless it can be held
that Article XVI, Section 1 is inapplicable, or unless the decision turns upon
the grounds that Judge Dye put forth. In his opinion, Judge Fuld, although
discussing Section 45-a generally, impliedly rejected this contention.
In any event four Judges did hold the 1959 amendment valid per se under
both provisions of Article XVI, Section 1. This was the only actual holding
in the case. The various positions of the Judges on Section 45-a can be con-
sidered dicta at this point in time.
M. A. L.
RECEIPTS FROM SERVICES AFFECTING INTERSTATE COMMERCE, BUT LOCAL IN
NATURE, TAXABLE
In Mohegan International Corp. v. City of New York, 50 petitioner sought
a declaratory judgment that the New York City General Business and Financial
48. Cf, People ex rel. New York Cent. and H.R.R. Ry. Co. v. Miealey, 224 N.Y. 187,
120 N.E. 155 (1918), aff'd sub noa, Troy Union Ry. Co. v. Mealey, 254 US. 47 (1920) ;
New York Electric Lines Co. v. Empire City Subway, 235 U.S. 179 (1914); American
Smelting and Refining Co. v. Colorado, 204 U.S. 103 (1906).
49. In a supreme court case just decided the plaintiff was held to have no standing
to sue. See St. Clair v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., an unreported case decided in the Supreme
Court in Erie County.
50. 9 N.Y.2d 69, 211 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1961).
251
